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Abstract
The authors explore the properties of various types of public and private pricing on a
congested road network, with heterogeneous users, and allowing for elastic demand. The
network allows them to model certain features of real-world signiﬁcance: pricing
restrictions on either complementary or substitute links, as well as interactions between
different user groups on shared links. They ﬁnd that revenue-maximising pricing is much
less efﬁcient than welfare-maximising pricing, but this difference is mitigated by the
product differentiation made possible with heterogeneous users. Ignoring heterogeneity
causes the welfare beneﬁts of a policy of current interest, namely second-best pricing of one
of two parallel links, to be dramatically underestimated. Unlike ﬁrst-best policies, second-
best policies are in danger of losing much of their potential effectiveness if heterogeneity is
ignored when setting toll levels.
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1. Introduction
Economists have long advocated Pigovian taxes and related ‘‘market-like’’
policies to attain better pricing of goods supplied by the public sector.
Most such policies are enacted on a piecemeal and limited basis, if at all.
Cases in point are the marketable permits established by the US Clean Air
Act of 1990 and several heavily restricted pollution trading schemes
reviewed by Hahn (1989).
One of the best-studied applications of Pigovian taxes is road pricing.
The economic fundamentals were well laid out by Pigou (1920), Knight
(1924), Walters (1961), and Vickrey (1963, 1969). The concept is favoured
by many transport policy makers, but mainly in the form of experiments
or demonstrations rather than full-scale applications (Small and Go´mez-
Iba´n˜ez, 1998). Examples include toll rings around city centres in Norway,
the recent area-based congestion charging scheme in central London,
peak-period toll surcharges on certain French expressways, special tolled
express lanes on two freeway segments in southern California, and a single
congestion-priced expressway near Toronto.
This history suggests an increasing importance of partial rather than
ﬁrst-best congestion-pricing schemes. Such schemes include privately or
publicly operated toll roads parallel to unpriced highways. Depending on
the particular scheme, pricing may be prohibited on routes that are either
substitutes for or complements to the one that is priced, and may involve
either social or private objectives. Thus a comprehensive analysis requires
a model permitting a variety of objectives and pricing constraints. Because
much of the purpose of these schemes is to test and shape public opinion,
distributional issues are often paramount. Focusing on these turns out to
be quite interesting because some of these demonstrations offer highly
differentiated products.
In this paper, we simultaneously address issues of second-best policy,
public or private objectives, product differentiation, and distribution as
they arise from constrained road pricing. We are interested in quantitative
statements about the importance of various phenomena, such as user
heterogeneity, and so rely heavily on a numerical version of our model; it
uses (for its base case) an empirically obtained distribution of values of
time for morning peak road users. We analyse both substitutes and
complements to the link(s) being priced by using a simple network with
both parallel and serial links. Such a set-up can represent, for example,
parallel priced and unpriced arterials entering a city centre where their
users interact on congested streets.
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A preview of especially interesting results includes the ﬁnding that
ignoring heterogeneity in values of time may cause the welfare beneﬁts of
second-best policies to be drastically underestimated, by a factor of nine in
our base case. Private (that is, proﬁt-maximising) pricing is almost always
worse than no pricing, except when a private route has signiﬁcant free-ﬂow
speed advantages over the free parallel route. Heterogeneity makes ﬁrst-
best differentiated pricing strongly anti-egalitarian, so much so that it may
actually worsen the travel times faced by low-value-of-time users even
while requiring them to pay — a paradox explained by its effect of
channelling these users onto just a portion of the total capacity but then
applying a low price to them. Second-best pricing is much more
egalitarian; however, welfare is greatly enhanced if instead of pricing
just a small portion of the network, most capacity is priced with only a
small portion reserved as a free option. Finally, offering a differentiated
product can produce the intriguing possibility that a second-best pricing
policy may provide beneﬁts to those who care least and to those who care
most about service quality, while hurting those in the middle — hardly an
ideal set-up for political success.
Such results pose challenges for the demonstration-project approach to
pricing policy. There is a real danger that most of the hoped-for welfare
beneﬁts from pricing will be lost, or even turned into disbeneﬁts; or that
speciﬁc groups will incur perverse results such as higher price and worse
service at the same time. On the other hand, dispersion in preferences does
offer the potential to reap substantial beneﬁts through product
differentiation, which lends itself to an experimental approach. Our
model provides a ﬂexible and realistic tool to study these advantages and
disadvantages.
2. The Analytical Model
2.1. Previous literature
Most of the literature concerning second-best addresses two parallel routes
where one of the two routes is untolled. Le´vy-Lambert (1968), Marchand
(1968), and Verhoef, Nijkamp, and Rietveld (1996) use the static model of
Walters (1961) and Vickrey (1963), while Braid (1996) uses the dynamic
bottleneck model of Vickrey (1969). The main conclusions are that the
second-best toll trades off route split effects against overall demand
effects; that this toll is usually considerably smaller than the ﬁrst-best toll;
and that second-best pricing often leads to much smaller welfare gains
Product Differentiation on Roads Verhoef and Small
129
than ﬁrst-best pricing. Liu and McDonald (1998) conﬁrm these results for
parameters designed to match one of the California pricing demonstration
projects (SR-91 in Orange County). Yang and Huang (1999) endogenise
vehicle occupancy and allow for free carpool access to the tolled route.
Revenue-maximising congestion tolls for a single highway are derived
by Edelson (1971) and Mills (1981). When just one of two parallel roads
can be priced, Verhoef et al. (1996) and Liu and McDonald (1998, 1999)
ﬁnd that the revenue-maximising price is typically much higher than the
second-best price and will achieve very much lower, usually negative,
welfare gains. McDonald et al. (1999) derive the second-best toll on a link
that has both an unpriced substitute and an unpriced complement; but
they are unable to say whether the complementary link makes the toll
higher or lower. De Palma and Lindsey (2000) consider a variety of
ownership regimes, including private and mixed duopolies, both with and
without constraints on pricing one of two parallel roads; they focus
especially on the effects of time-varying demand patterns and correspond-
ing time-varying tolls. Viton (1995) considers the prospects for a private
operator to cover the cost of road construction, reaching optimistic
conclusions due to the high toll that can be charged even when in close
competition with a free public road.
Very few studies of the two-route problem incorporate heterogeneity in
value of time, which turns out to have important implications within a
second-best context. The few exceptions all lack some essential feature of
our model. Arnott, De Palma, and Lindsey (1992) consider two user
groups and two routes within the bottleneck model; but they do not
consider the case when only one route can be priced. Small and Yan (2001)
do consider such a case, but also with just two discrete user groups.
Mohring (1979) considers a continuous distribution of values of travel
time, but in the context of competing bus and automobile modes;
furthermore, he does not analyse dispersion in value of time separately
from mean value of time and therefore cannot investigate, as we can, the
effects of dispersion separately from those of mean value of time. Less
closely related are the analyses by Train, McFadden, and Goett (1987) and
by Train, Ben-Akiva, and Atherton (1989) of electricity and telephone
users, respectively, facing a voluntary choice among alternative rate
schedules with different time-of-day characteristics.
Models that treat two discrete user groups, besides providing only a
crude approximation to real heterogeneity, result in analytical difﬁculties
due to several distinct types of pooled or separated equilibria. In the
present paper, we consider instead a continuum of user types. Only two
types of equilibria then occur: pooled (when tolls are absent or exactly
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equal on the two parallel routes), or fully separated (in all other cases).1
Moreover, using a continuum of values of time allows intermediate groups
to be considered explicitly.
2.2. Basic set-up: network, demand, congestion, and equilibrium conditions
In order to focus on the role of heterogeneity and product differentiation,
we specify preferences in considerable detail, and we use a network that is
simple yet permits varying degrees of differentiation of trip conditions. We
omit from our model a number of practical considerations that would
affect policy conclusions for any speciﬁc facility. We do not include the
costs of toll collection, and we consider only congestion among the many
possible sources of difference between private and social cost — ignoring,
for example, taxes, accident costs, air pollution, energy security, noise, and
land-use impacts. We treat user preferences for travel as exogenous rather
than derived, and capacities as given. Finally, we do not examine the
political economy or industrial organisation of public and private
operation of highways; rather, we use ‘‘public’’ and ‘‘private’’ as
shorthand for second-best optimisation and revenue maximisation,
respectively. This means, of course, that ‘‘public’’ operation wins any
contest by deﬁnition; but the interesting questions we explore are by how
much, and depending on what factors?
The network is shown in Figure 1. There is just one origin-destination
pair, OD, connected by two routes: AC (consisting of links A and C) and
BC (consisting of links B and C). The user evaluates a trip from O to D
solely in terms of its ‘‘full price,’’ which includes money cost and self-
perceived time cost; in terms of this full price, the routes are assumed to be
perfect substitutes. Congestion is represented by assuming that travel time
on link L is a non-decreasing function of the number of users NL who
travel on that link: TL ¼ TLðNLÞ with T 0L  0 (primes are used to denote
derivatives).
Figure 1
The Network Considered
O D 
A 
C 
B 
1When tolls are zero or equal a partially separated equilibrium is also possible, but its characteristics
are identical to the pooled equilibrium so we rule it out by assumption.
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Any link L may have a toll, tL: However, because there are three links
but only two routes, there is one redundant toll: a constant can be
subtracted from tA and tB; and added to tC; without affecting the price of
either route. For convenience, we normalize tC to zero except when we
wish to require the prices of the two routes to be equal, in which case we
normalise tA ¼ tB ¼ 0 and allow tC to represent the single uniform price.
The full price of a route from O to D consists of the sum over the links
constituting that route.
The time-cost component of full price is fully determined by the travel
time and a parameter a that we call ‘‘value of time.’’ Thus for a traveller
with value of time a; the travel cost on link L is a  TL: User heterogeneity
(other than that inherent in a downward-sloping demand curve) is
represented by specifying a continuum of these values of time. We use Na
to denote the number of users travelling between O and D with value of
time a; or more precisely, the density function of a across users; that is,
there are Na  da users within an inﬁnitesimally small range ½a;aþ da of
user types. For each user type a; downward-sloping demand is represented
by deﬁning an inverse demand function DaðNaÞ; which can be viewed as
stating the reservation ‘‘full price’’ of the marginal user of type a when
there are Na users of that type choosing to travel.
Combining the inverse demand curves for the various values of a into a
single diagram produces an inverse demand surface. Figure 2 shows one
such surface, namely the one used in the numerical model of Sections 3
and 4. (We explain there how we derived Figure 2.) Intersecting this
Figure 2
An Inverse Demand Surface
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surface with a plane at constant a depicts a (linear) downward-sloping
demand curve for that value of a: Intersecting it with a plane Da ¼ 0
depicts the density function of values of time in the population of people
willing to travel when there is no time or money cost of doing so (that
density function peaks at about a ¼ 6:4DFl=hrÞ:2 Intersecting the surface
with the plane Da ¼ 0:972a depicts the density function — peaking at
6.1DFl/hr—of values of time of those willing to travel when there is no
money cost but the time required is 0.972 hours (this happens to coincide
with our base case without toll, and the curve was calibrated to reproduce
an empirically derived value-of-time distribution for this particular case).
Variations across users in value of time may arise from many sources
including income, gender, type of profession, and unobservable personal
characteristics. We need not distinguish them here; in fact, we do not
require even that the same individuals be ranked in the same order on
different days, so long as the distribution is stable. In particular, we
caution against the temptation to think of the value-of-time distribution as
simply representing the income distribution; for example, observations on
two southern California experiments suggest that the value of time that
users exhibit in their choices is far from perfectly correlated with their
income (Brownstone and Small, 2003).
We now consider user equilibrium in route choice. Each user is
assumed to take prices and travel times on each link as given. Let NaL and
NaR be the density functions of user types on link L and on route R: For
each user type a and route R; these functions must satisfy the
complementary slackness conditions of Wardrop (1952):
NaR  ðPaR DaÞ ¼ 0; ð1aÞ
NaR  0; ð1bÞ
PaR Da  0; ð1cÞ
where PaR is the ‘‘full price’’ of using route R; deﬁned as:
PaR  a  ðTL þ TCÞ þ tL þ tC; fL;Rg ¼ fA;ACg; fB;BCg: ð1dÞ
These equations state that type-a users will use only the route(s) that have
least full price to them, and that the reservation price of the marginal type-
a user cannot exceed that full price.
Formally, we must proceed differently in solving equations (1)
depending on whether or not tA ¼ tB: When tA ¼ tB; positive use can
2The exchange rate of the Dutch guilder in late 1999 was approximately DFl 2.2 = d1 = US$1.
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occur on both roads only if travel times are equal, since otherwise all users
would choose the road with the lower travel time. In that case, we need an
additional condition to obtain a unique equilibrium. The one we choose,
which is entirely innocuous, is that NaA=NaB ¼ NA=NB for every a: This
yields a perfectly pooled equilibrium, which we can analyse by merging
links A and B into a single link, D, whose travel time is simply a function
TDðNÞ of total trafﬁc N:3
When tA 6¼ tB; non-zero use of both routes can occur provided that
signfTB  TAg ¼ signftA  tBg: This yields a separated equilibrium, in
which users differ between the routes according to value of time. The
difference in full price for user a can be written as
ðtA þ a  TAÞ  ðtB þ a  TBÞ; therefore the critical value a for which
users are indifferent between the routes is:
a ¼ tB  tA
TA  TB : ð2Þ
It is easily checked that, when tA < tB; link A is more attractive for all
drivers with a < a and link B is more attractive for all drivers with
a > a: That is, users with a relatively low value of time use only the link
with the lower toll, and those with high value of time use the link with the
higher toll.
To complete the model, the following identities are added:
NaC ¼ NaA þNaB; ð3Þ
NL ¼
Z amax
amin
NaL da; ð4Þ
where amin and amax are the minimum and maximum values of time in the
population. In the case where tA < tB; (4) implies:
NA ¼
Z a
amin
NaA da; ð4aÞ
NB ¼
Z amax
a
NaB da: ð4bÞ
3This function is chosen to be consistent with an allocation N ¼ NA þNB such that
TAðNAÞ ¼ TBðNBÞ ¼ TDðNÞ is satisﬁed (a condition that easily yields a unique solution with the
well-behaved congestion functions we use). It has the property that ð1=T 0DÞ ¼ ð1=T 0AÞ þ ð1=T 0BÞ:
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2.3. Tolling regimes
We now consider the problem of a private or public operator choosing a
toll or set of tolls. It does so knowing that two simultaneous adjustments
to the toll will take place: (a) individuals will choose routes, given tolls and
travel times, according to equations (1)–(4); and (b) travel times on each
link will adjust to the level of users, according to the equation
TL ¼ TLðNLÞ describing congestion.
We consider not individual tolls but rather toll regimes, that is, rules for
setting tolls. Our network allows us to analyse a wide variety of such
regimes, of which we consider six, in addition to no tolls. These six are
deﬁned as the product of two possible objectives (public or private) and
three possible choices of where tolls can be applied (entire network,
parallel link B only, or serial link C only). These regimes are deﬁned in
Table 1, and may be described as follows.
With public tolling, the objective is to maximise net social welfare. Net
social welfare is deﬁned as the volume below the inverse demand surface of
Figure 2 less total costs.4 In the unconstrained ﬁrst-best (FB) regime where
the entire network priced, welfare is maximised by setting prices on the
two parallel links (recalling that a toll on the serial link is then redundant).
In the two second-best (SB) regimes, only a single price can be set, either
on one of the two parallel links (SBPL) or on the serial link (SBSL).
Table 1
Tolling Regimes
Abbreviation Description Tolls on:
NT No Tolls –
Public tolling:
FB First-Best tolls on the full network A and B
SBPL Second-Best toll on one of the Parallel Links B
SBSL Second-Best toll on the Serial Link C
Private tolling
PF Private tolls on the Full network A and B
PPL Private toll on one of the Parallel Links B
PSL Private toll on the Serial Link C
4Equivalently, net social welfare is equal to Marshallian consumer surplus plus revenues. It would be
possible, in the current framework, to deﬁne a social welfare function reﬂecting distributional
concerns; but we think it is more useful to use one that identiﬁes the distributional effects of a policy
but does not in itself have a redistributional objective — that is, it would not call for individual-
speciﬁc tolls if there was no congestion.
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The cost part of the objective takes a slightly different mathematical
form depending whether the resulting equilibrium is separated or pooled,
as described earlier. When tA < tB; there is a separated equilibrium
deﬁned by the critical value of time a given by (2), and the objective can
be written as:
W ¼
Z amax
amin
Z Na
0
DaðnÞ dn da
Z a
amin
NaA  a  TA
Z a
amin
NaA da
 
da

Z amax
a
NaB  a  TB
Z amax
a
NaB da
 
da

Z amax
amin
Na  a  TC
Z amax
amin
Na da
 
da:
ð5aÞ
In (5a) we have used the equilibrium results, described earlier, that
NaB ¼ 0 for a < a;NaA ¼ 0 for a > a; and NaC ¼ NaA þNaB ¼ Na:
When tA ¼ tB ¼ 0; there is a pooled equilibrium in which links A and B
can be treated as a merged link D with their combined capacity; in that
case the middle two terms on the right-hand side of (5a) are replaced by:

Z amax
amin
Na  a  TD
Z amax
amin
Na da
 
da: ð5bÞ
With private tolling, the objective is to maximise total toll revenues, R:
Again, this can be done in three ways: private tolling on the full network
(PF), on one parallel link only (PPL), or on the serial link only (PSL).
Using dummy variables dL to denote whether or not a toll is in operation
on link L; this objective function can be written as:
R ¼ dAtA
Z a
amin
NaA daþ dBtB
Z amax
a
NaB daþ dCtC
Z amax
amin
Na da: ð6Þ
This equation holds also when tA ¼ tB ¼ 0; but in that case the ﬁrst two
terms on the right-hand side are zero so there is no need to deﬁne a:
As is common in normative pricing models, it is simpler to maximise
the objective by choosing the numbers of travellers on each route rather
than by choosing the price directly. In that way each of the four
constrained pricing regimes and also the no toll (NT) regime can be
represented by a continuum of constraints, one for each value of a; with
each constraint representing the requirement of user equilibrium as
embodied in equation (1a). When tA < tB (recalling that we can then
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normalise tC ¼ 0), the constraints are then represented by adding the
following Lagrangian terms to the objective function:
þ
Z a
amin
laA 

a  TA
Z a
amin
NaA da
 
þ a  TC
Z amax
amin
Na da
 
þ dA  tADaðNaÞ

da;
þ
Z amax
a
laB 

a  TB
Z amax
a
NaB da
 
þ a  TC
Z amax
amin
Na da
 
þ dB  tBDaðNaÞ

da; ð7aÞ
where laL is the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint (1a) for those
values of a having positive NaL: The round brackets in (7a) represent the
functional relationship deﬁning congestion TLðNLÞ on link L: When
tA ¼ tB ¼ 0; (7a) is replaced by:
þ
Z amax
amin
la 

a  TC
Z amax
amin
Na da

þ a  TD
Z amax
amin
Na da
 
þ tC DaðNaÞ

da: ð7bÞ
For those tolling regimes (FB, SBSL, PSL) where the resulting toll
formula is in closed form, the tax rules are rather straightforward
generalisations of those applying with only a single value of time, as
given in Verhoef et al. (1996). We therefore relegate the derivation and
discussion of the ﬁrst-order conditions and toll formulae to a separate
appendix available from the authors upon request. For the other three
regimes (SBPL, PF, PPL), the discontinuity at a prevented us from
ﬁnding a closed-form analytical solution for the optimal toll, so
instead we devised a numerical algorithm to maximise the objective
function.
3. A Numerical Model: the Base Case
In this section we present a numerical model to assess and illustrate the
economic properties of these tolling regimes.
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3.1. The cost side
The cost side of the model consists of link travel-time functions, describing
travel times TL as a function of usage NL: The functional form used is
TL ¼ TFL  1þ b  NL
KL
 k" #
; ð8Þ
where b and k are parameters, TFL is the free-ﬂow travel time on link L;
and KL is conventionally called the ‘‘capacity’’ of link L: (Because there is
no maximum ﬂow for this type of congestion function, ‘‘relative capacity’’
would actually be a better term.) This functional form has been used
extensively for analysis of congestion and seems to ﬁt actual data fairly
well (Small, 1992). We choose b ¼ 0:15 and k ¼ 4 throughout our
simulations, making it the well-known formula of US Bureau of Public
Roads (1964). For capacities KL; we assume in our base case that link A
has three-fourths, and link B one-fourth, of their joint capacity, which for
convenience we set it at 8,000 vehicles per hour. We assign this same joint
capacity to link C. We also assign free-ﬂow travel times of 22.5 minutes to
links A and B, and 7.5 minutes to link C. Hence the set-up could represent
a four-lane highway with tolling possible along three-fourths of its
distance.5 Table 2 summarises these base-case parameters.
3.2. The demand side
The base-case inverse demand surface, depicted in Figure 2, is determined
as follows. For every value of time, the demand function is taken to be
linear over the relevant range (between the lowest and highest use levels
considered):
Da ¼ ma  da Na: ð9Þ
Functions ma and da are calibrated to achieve three objectives: (1) a
weighted demand elasticity (over all a) of 0:4 in the NT equilibrium;6 (2)
travel time in the base-case no-toll regime equal to twice the free-ﬂow
travel time; and (3) a distribution of values of time in the NT-equilibrium
similar to that found in an earlier stated preference study for the Dutch
5A common approximation for freeway capacities is 2,000 vehicles per hour per lane. For more
detailed discussions of capacity, see Small (1992, pp 61–68) or Transportation Research Board (1998).
6See, for example, Verhoef et al. (1996) for evidence on this elasticity, which is with respect to full price.
In calculating it from the demand surface, we include in the full price a variable monetary cost set to
DFl 12 per trip (6 litres of fuel at price DFl 2/litre). This variable monetary cost, however, is assumed
constant over the various tolling regimes considered, and so is ignored in the simulations.
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Randstad area (Verhoef et al., 1997).7 The following functions achieve
these objectives:
ma ¼50þ a ð10aÞ
da ¼ 0:0434783ð0:713714þ 0:705429  a 0:0950357  a2
þ0:00468093  a3  0:000079  a4Þ: ð10bÞ
(These same functions ma and da are retained for the sensitivity analyses as
well, except for cases that explicitly vary the demand characteristics, even
though the functions no longer yield precisely the results described in (1)–(3)
above.) The values of time a considered in the simulations range between a
minimum of DFl 1.2 and a maximum of DFl 23.8 per hour, with a weighted
average value of DFl 9.08 in the base case described below.
3.3. General results: base case
Table 3 presents results for the various tolling regimes using these base-
case parameters. Welfare results are summarised by an index o showing a
given policy’s welfare gain (compared to no tolls) as a fraction of the
maximum possible such welfare gain.
The ﬁrst-best (FB) policy produces substantial service differentiation,
with travel on link A 28 per cent faster than on link B. But this policy also
produces some surprises. First, welfare is maximised when the facility with
the larger capacity (link A) gets the premium service, in contrast to what
Table 2
The Base-Case Parameters for the
Cost Functions
Link A Link B Link C
b 0.15 0.15 0.15
k 4 4 4
TFL (hr) 0.375 0.375 0.125
KL (veh/hr) 6000 2000 8000
7This distribution was derived using 961 (93 per cent) of the 1027 respondents for whom a value of
time could be calculated: the 7 per cent with the highest values of time were discarded so as to keep a
compact distribution. A simple fourth-order polynomial was ﬁtted on the histogram of values of time,
split in 12 categories of size DFl 2 ðR2 ¼ 0:975Þ: Because of the selection, the average value of time
used here is DFl 9.08, as opposed to DFl 10.92 for the full set of respondents. As we note later, this
distribution is approximately that shown as the dashed line in Figure 4.
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one might expect from the analogy of ﬁrst-class service on aeroplanes and
trains. Second, although overall demand is reduced (by 14 per cent)
compared to the no-toll (NT) regime, congestion on the lower-priced link
is actually worse than with no tolls. In the base case, this paradox
disappears when the portion of the trip on link C is taken into account —
all users then receive faster service in the ﬁrst-best policy than in the no-
toll policy. However, Section 4.2 presents an example where even the total
travel time for the lower-priced link actually increases with optimal tolling.
Apparently product differentiation is a strong motivation here, calling for
a rather low optimal service quality for the segment of the population with
lower values of time.
A third surprise with FB is how small the toll differentiation is: the tolls
on links A and B differ from each other by only 15 per cent. There are two
reasons for this. First, although the average value of time of link-B users is
smaller, there are more of them (per unit of capacity), and these two effects
work in opposite directions on the external cost of a trip. Second, link-B
users interact with higher-value-of-time users on the shared link C, which
further increases the marginal cost they impose.
Given the limited degree of optimal toll differentiation, it is not too
surprising that the uniform toll policy, SBSL, performs nearly as well in
Table 3
Performance of the Various Toll Regimes for the Base-Case Parameters
NT FB SBPL SBSL PF PPL PSL Free-ﬂow
Rel. use Aa 1 0.812 1.046 0.854 0.498 1.117 0.527
Rel. use Ba 1 1.003 0.831 0.854 0.616 0.533 0.527
Rel. use Ca 1 0.860 0.992 0.854 0.527 0.971 0.527
 (DFl/hr) – 5.919 12.996 – 6.138 15.265 –
Travel time A (hr) 0.729 0.529 0.798 0.563 0.397 0.926 0.402 0.375
Travel time B (hr) 0.729 0.733 0.544 0.563 0.426 0.404 0.402 0.375
Travel time C (hr) 0.243 0.189 0.239 0.188 0.134 0.230 0.134 0.125
Toll A (DFl) 0 9.50 0 0 27.83 0 0
Toll B (DFl) 0 8.29 3.31 0 27.65 7.98 0
Toll C (DFl) 0 0 0 9.38 0 0 27.80
Toll revenues (DFl) 0 99606 8703 101 484 185 603 13 468 185 487
!b 0 1 0.229 0.920 2.599 0.272 2.623
aUse relative to that in NT scenario. The latter is: 9501 on link A, 3167 on link B, 12669 on link C. As
discussed in the text, the fact that these exceed link ‘‘capacity’’ is entirely consistent with the power-
law model of equation (8). The NT-use levels are probably best thought of as covering a peak period
of about 1.5 hours.
bIndex of relative efﬁciency: increase in social welfare (compared to NT) as a share of the increase in
social welfare (compared to NT) obtained in the ﬁrst-best optimum. The latter increase is DFl 16743,
or DFl 1.32 per user in the NT equilibrium.
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terms of efﬁciency. It achieves 92 per cent of the maximum possible
welfare gains, at a uniform toll quite close to the higher of the
differentiated FB tolls. Although not shown in the table, one can readily
see that most or all low-value-of-time users are worse off with a uniform
toll policy than with FB because the uniform policy forces them to accept
a higher service quality and higher price than they prefer. (We discuss the
distributional effects at greater length in the next subsection.)
By contrast, when only one of the parallel links can be priced (SBPL),
namely the one with 25 per cent of total capacity, less than one-fourth of
the possible welfare gains are achieved. Consistent with the studies
reviewed earlier, the second-best toll is much lower than ﬁrst-best. The
reason is that now, welfare gains on link B from raising its price have to be
traded off against welfare losses of spill-over trafﬁc onto link A.
Nevertheless there is a surprise for second-best policy as well: as we
shall see in Section 4.1, more than twice as large a welfare gain could be
achieved with second-best parallel pricing by pricing the high-capacity
section of the road instead of the low-capacity section. This result is
related to the fact that with ﬁrst-best pricing, it was the higher-capacity
road that received the higher price.
We now turn to tolling by a private operator. Unrestricted revenue-
maximising tolling extracts a high social cost: welfare is substantially lower
than with no tolls at all, especially when both links can be priced (PF). This
is because the tolls are set much higher than the corresponding second-best
or ﬁrst-best optimal tolls: more than twice as high for PPL as for SBPL, and
around three times as high for PF as for FB. This is consistent with earlier
results, although it is not necessarily the case that revenue-maximising
tolling would always lead to a decrease in social welfare.8 Of course,
revenues are correspondingly greater in just those cases where the price is set
much higher than is optimal, and this must be taken into account in policy
design if some of the capacity is to be ﬁnanced by toll revenues.
There is a surprise in private tolling, as well: the toll differentiation in
unrestricted private pricing (policy PF) is negligible. The reason is that the
monopoly toll level has reduced total trafﬁc by so much (47 per cent) that
nearly all congestion is eliminated, making signiﬁcant service differentia-
tion impossible.
3.4. Distributional results: base case
The numerical simulations allow us to calculate the distribution of welfare
effects of the various tolling regimes across people with different values of
8See Verhoef et al. (1996), De Palma and Lindsey (2000), and Small and Yan (2001).
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time. In this sub-section, we present such results for just two public tolling
regimes: FB and SBPL.
Figure 3 shows the changes in total and average consumer surplus by
value of time, compared to the NT regime.9 For each value of time, the
total change in consumer surplus is given by the change in full price for
those users who remain on the road, plus the change in surplus for those
who leave the road due to tolling. The average change is deﬁned as the
total change divided by the level of use in the NT regime. The ﬁgure shows
that under ﬁrst-best tolling (solid line), the average loss in surplus is
smaller for people with a higher value of time. This result arises, of course,
because the price increase is offset by a travel-time decrease, which is
valued more by such people. The kink seen in the right panel, which occurs
at a; is due to the fact that the ratio of toll paid to travel time gained
differs across the two parallel links.
Figure 4 shows the levels of road use by value of time for the same two
policies.10 Since the use under SBPL is very close to that under NT, the
dashed line in the left panel also gives a good impression of the original
distribution of values of time used. Relative use, in the right panel, is
deﬁned in the same way as in Table 3. The right panel in Figure 4 follows
the same general pattern as that in Figure 3, simply because the change in
consumer surplus is closely related to the change in full price, which in
turn determines the change in use.
For the SBPL regime (dashed lines in Figures 3 and 4), it is then users
near the critical value of time who suffer the largest average losses (Figure
3, right panel). The reason is that imposing second-best tolling on link B
improves travel time for people taking that route, while worsening it for
Figure 3
Total (left panel) and Average (right panel) Change in Consumers’ Surplus, Compared to
NT, before Tax Recycling
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9Units are total consumer surplus in DFl per unit interval of value of time (the latter in DFl/hr).
10Units are numbers of users per unit interval of value of time (the latter in DFl/hr).
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those taking the other route. Users near the critical value of time beneﬁt
least among those choosing the priced link from its travel-time reduction,
and suffer most among those choosing the unpriced link from its travel-
time increase. One could say that the policy caters to the more extreme
users, leaving those in the middle disadvantaged. However, none of the
consumer-surplus changes are very large, the biggest loss amounting to
just DFl 0.85 (US$ 0.40) per trip. These changes are much smaller than
under FB, and users with the highest values of time even beneﬁt directly
from SBPL, that is, they are better off regardless of use of toll revenues.
This helps explain why parallel-route pricing appears to be more
politically acceptable than ﬁrst-best tolling.
As expected, the relative attractiveness of the FB and SB regimes may
be reversed by redistributing the toll revenues. Figure 5 shows the changes
in total and average consumer surplus after applying the simplest possible
tax-recycling scheme: an equal redistribution to all initial road users. This
simply means an upward shift of each of the curves shown in the right
panel of Figure 3. Because revenue is much larger under ﬁrst-best than
second-best pricing, the solid curve is shifted up by much more than the
dashed curve, so that ﬁrst-best pricing is now better than second-best
pricing for all but the very lowest-value-of-time users. Furthermore, ﬁrst-
best pricing is now welfare-enhancing for every user compared to no
tolls.11 When these average surplus changes are multiplied by the level of
use shown in the left panel of Figure 3, the result is the curious double-
peaked distribution of change in total consumer surplus shown on the left
panel of Figure 5.
Figure 4
Total (Left Panel) and Relative (Right Panel) Use; the vertical lines indicate a
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11A similar result in a mode choice context was observed by Small (1983).
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Under private tolling, it can be expected that the distribution of
changes in average consumer surplus will show patterns comparable to
those shown in the right panel of Figure 3, for the same reasons as
outlined above. Of course, the absolute welfare losses will be larger; and
since all the private tolling regimes generate net welfare losses, no
redistribution could make everyone better off. In practice, private tolls are
likely to be restricted by additional regulations, such as rate-of-return caps
or direct price regulation; our results provide support for some such
restriction.
4. Sensitivity Analysis
In this Section we assess the impact of key parameters upon the relative
performance of the different tolling regimes. We start by varying
parameters related to the cost side of the model, namely the capacities
and lengths of the links, while holding the demand surface invariant. We
next consider the impact of two characteristics of the demand side: the
(weighted) demand elasticity, and the type of distribution of values of
time.
4.1. Varying the relative capacities of the two parallel links
We ﬁrst consider the impacts of increasing the fraction of the highway
subject to tolling, keeping total joint capacity of links A and B ﬁxed.
Figures 6a and 6b show the optimal tolls and the relative efﬁciency o;
respectively, if the capacity of B is increased, in 25 per cent steps, from 0 to
100 per cent of the joint capacity (recall that the base-case is at 25 per
Figure 5
Total (Left Panel) and Average (Right Panel) Change in Consumers’ Surplus, Compared to
NT, After Non-differentiated Tax Recycling
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cent).12 Unsurprisingly, the greatest impacts of capacity allocation occur
for those policies constraining a parallel link, namely SBPL and PPL. For
Figure 6a
Varying the Relative Capacities of the Two Parallel Links: Tolls
Note: For graphical clarity, tolls for SBSL and PSL, being close to those for FB and PF, are surpressed. 
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Figure 6b
Varying the Relative Capacities of the Two Parallel Links: Relative Efﬁciency
Note: For graphical clarity, relative efficiency for PSL, being close to that for PF, is surpressed. 
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Capacity B as a fraction of capacity A+B
R
el
at
iv
e 
ef
fic
ie
n
cy
Omega FB
Omega SBPL
Omega SBSL
Omega PF
Omega PPL
12On the left-hand side of these ﬁgures, therefore, SBPL and PPL are identical to NT, because no
capacity is tolled; whereas on the right-hand side, they are identical to SBSL and PSL, respectively,
because all the capacity is tolled. At both extremes, toll differentiation is impossible, so FB is
identical to SBSL and PF to PSL.
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public tolling, greater capacity of B makes the second-best policy (SBPL)
relatively more efﬁcient, because the importance of the unpriced substitute
is diminished; at 75 per cent capacity, nearly half the possible welfare gains
are realised. These results suggest that from an efﬁciency viewpoint, and
taking into account heterogeneity of users, one public ‘‘free-lane’’ on a
four-lane highway is preferable to one public ‘‘pay-lane’’. In other words,
it would be better to think of a priced system with a ‘‘life-line’’ type of
unpriced service available to those who most need it, rather than an
unpriced system with special premium service for the elite.
The opposite holds for private tolling. The private operator, ignoring
the efﬁciency aspects of spill-overs, increases the toll on the parallel route
rapidly as its relative capacity increases. This substantially increases the
relative welfare losses from PPL, at least up to 75 per cent of capacity.
Oddly, once at least 75 per cent of capacity is allocated to a private
operator it is better that all capacity be so allocated; this counterintuitive
result, also found by Verhoef et al. (1996), occurs because full control of
the network avoids inefﬁcient route splits. Finally, the ﬁnding of relatively
limited price differentiation under FB pricing remains intact.13
Together, these results contradict the idea that efﬁciency always
increases monotonically with the degree of privatisation. If one insists on a
system with both unpriced and priced alternatives, it is more efﬁcient to
allow a public operator to price most of the capacity, but a private
operator only a small portion of it instead.
4.2. Varying the relative length of the serial link
Most studies ignore the likelihood that users of two parallel routes will not
be completely isolated, but rather will share some links upstream or
downstream of the split road section. Figure 7 shows how this feature
affects the relative efﬁciency of the various tolling regimes considered.
Along the horizontal axis, the relative length of the serial link C –
represented by its free-ﬂow travel time – is increased in 25 per cent steps,
keeping the total free-ﬂow travel time constant. Note that when the
relative length of C has become 1, the parallel links effectively disappear so
FB becomes identical to SBSL and PF to PSL.
As the relative length of the serial link increases, second-best toll
differentiation becomes less viable, so both the public and private tolls on
13The FB scheme will have differentiated tolls throughout. The intersection of the lines representing tA
and tB in Figure 6a results from graphical interpolation only, and is near the point where it becomes
more efﬁcient to charge a higher toll on link B than on link A, instead of the other way around. A
similar argument holds for PF, and also for FB in Figure 8a below.
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the parallel link fall (even per kilometre) and approach zero. As a result,
the relative efﬁciencies of these regimes approach zero as well. From a
societal point of view, this is bad news in the case of the public toll and
good news in the case of the private toll. This ﬁnding suggests that the
relative efﬁciency gains or losses from parallel route pricing are likely to be
overstated in studies ignoring the existence of serial, common used links.
For instance, oSBPL is equal to 0.29 when link C has zero length, but falls
to 0.16 when C is equally long as A and B and to 0.08 when C is 3 times as
long. Similarly oPPL changes from 0:28 to 0:16 over the same interval.
A similar pattern would be found if instead of increasing the relative
length of the serial link, its relative capacity was decreased.
The base-case result that FB tolling actually increases congestion (not
shown in diagram form) on link B, compared to no toll, remains true when
link C has zero length. Therefore, product differentiation alone can cause
optimal pricing to increase the travel times of lower-value-of-time users,
compared to no pricing. Of course, since FB pricing leads to a potential
Pareto improvement, it remains true that these users could be made better
off by some lump-sum redistribution of revenues. In practice, this result
raises a strong political barrier to optimal pricing — qualiﬁed, however, by
a reminder that low-value-of-time users are not necessarily the same
people from one day to the next.
Figure 7
Varying the Relative Length of the Serial Link: Relative Efﬁciency
Note: For graphical clarity, relative efficiency for PSL, being close to that for PF, is surpressed. 
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4.3. Varying the relative length of the parallel links
It is of course possible that the two parallel links are not lanes of the same
highway, but are separate roads instead. In that case, the parallel links
need not have equal free-ﬂow times. An example is a toll road that
parallels an arterial with at-grade intersections.
Figures 8a and 8b show how the tolls and the relative efﬁciency change
if the free-ﬂow travel times on links A and B are changed in opposite
directions. The base case is now in the centre of the diagram. As the
smaller-capacity link (B) becomes shorter when moving to the left, it
requires a relatively higher marginal external cost or a higher toll in order
to equalise marginal private costs on the two links. The tolls for link B
therefore have the tendency to increase when moving to the left, and to
decrease — even becoming negative — when moving to the right.14
Toll differentiation naturally becomes more important when the two
links are of different lengths: that is, when products vary in more
dimensions that just the amount of congestion.15 Consequently, the
potential welfare gain from fully optimal pricing (FB) increases as free-
ﬂow travel times become more unequal. Furthermore, when link B is
shorter (left side of Figure 8), there is less disadvantage to being unable to
price link A, so the relative welfare gain from SBPL also rises — to just
over 50 per cent at a 0.3 hours free-ﬂow travel time difference. A similar
result is also found by Verhoef et al. (1996, Figures 2 and 5) and Liu and
McDonald (1999, Table 1 and p187).
Another consequence is that equal prices on the parallel links become
increasingly unsatisfactory as the links become more unequal. As a result,
oSBSL decreases rapidly when moving to the edges of the diagram. The
shorter link tends to get the higher price for both FB and PF.16
14For SBPL, there will be a speciﬁc combination of parameters for which the second-best optimal toll
is actually zero (this combination is not among the plotted points). This requires link B to be longer
than link A. The two forces governing the second-best optimal level of the toll — reducing overall
trafﬁc and diverting trafﬁc from link A, where marginal external costs are higher, to link B — then
exactly offset each other. In this case, oSBPL is zero. Beyond that point, as Figure 8a shows, a subsidy
is welfare improving.
15This is illustrated by a curious result that appears when free-ﬂow travel time is 0.3 hr less on A than
on B. This case produces substantial price differentiation under FB pricing, as seen at the far right of
Figure 8a. But the second-best serial pricing for this case (SBSL, not shown in the diagram) produces
a toll that is lower than either FB toll — in contrast to all other simulations, where the serial toll lies
between the two FB tolls. The reason appears to be that SBSL pricing provides such an inferior
option for high-value-of-time users, relative to FB, that it substantially reduces their proportion in
the overall composition of trafﬁc. This lowers the marginal cost imposed by any driver sufﬁciently to
result in a second-best toll lower even than the lowest of the two ﬁrst-best tolls.
16Note that the o’s are in a sense ‘‘deﬂated’’ when moving to either side of Figure 8b, since the welfare
gain with FB increases, due to growing efﬁciency gains of toll differentiation. Therefore, the same
absolute welfare change with any given policy would show as a smaller relative welfare change.
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The relative efﬁciency of PPL declines somewhat more strongly than
that of SBPL when moving to the right. In the range where a subsidy
would be welfare enhancing when only link B can be tolled, o for PPL
remains low. It does not decrease any further though, since link B has
become relatively so unattractive that the monopolist is quite ‘‘harmless’’.
Figure 8a
Varying the Relative Lengths of the Parallel Links: Tolls
Note: For graphical clarity, tolls for SBSL and PSL, being close to those for FB and PF, are surpressed.  
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Figure 8b
Varying the Relative Lengths of the Parallel Links: Relative Efﬁciency
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On the far left-hand side, in contrast, we witness an instance of private
tolling on link B leading to an efﬁciency gain. With the other private
tolling policies (PF and PSL), the private operator actually has closed
down link B at both observations to the right of the base-case by setting
the tolls so that link B is not used.
4.4. Varying the overall capacity of the network
Next, we consider the effect of a simultaneous proportional increase of the
three links’ capacities. Since the demand function is unchanged, this
process effectively varies the amount of congestion. We examined the tolls
for four values of total capacity: 6,000, 8,000 (the base case), 10,000, and
100,000 vehicles per hour, all for the same demand surface. The results
(not depicted graphically) show that the degree of toll differentiation (in
FB and PF) increases with the equilibrium level of congestion. All public
tolls, as well as the PPL toll, approach zero as the capacity of the network
approaches inﬁnity and congestion vanishes. With PF and PSL, however,
the private operator can still extract monopoly proﬁts by tolling, leading
to tolls and welfare losses that do not approach zero.17
4.5. Varying the total (weighted) demand elasticity
In the next round of simulations, ma and da in equations (10) were
changed simultaneously so as to generate different weighted demand
elasticities in the NT equilibrium, keeping the total level of road use
approximately ﬁxed. (The calculation of demand elasticity is explained in
the ﬁrst footnote to Section 3.2.) Values of approximately
0:1;0:2;0:4 (the base case), and 0:8 were produced. Figure 9
shows the effect on relative efﬁciency.
At a more inelastic demand, the welfare effects of monopolistic pricing
become increasingly negative, as is well known from earlier studies
(Verhoef et al., 1996). Therefore, for PF and PSL, and to a lesser extent for
PPL, o falls rapidly and at an increasing rate when moving leftwards. A
new result, however, is also seen: as demand becomes more inelastic,
separation of trafﬁc with different values of time becomes relatively more
important for overall efﬁciency. Therefore, oSBPL increases and oSBSL
decreases when moving to the left.
17We also used this variation to double-check the logic of our private tolls by conﬁrming that, as
expected when congestion is negligible, the monopolist operates at the point where the total demand
elasticity (with respect to toll, not full price) is 1:
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4.6. Varying the type of distribution of values of time
Finally, we consider the extent to which the results presented depend on
the distribution of values of time. To that end, we reconstruct the base case
with two alternative types of distribution: a uniform distribution (which
has greater variance of values of time than the base case distribution) and
a degenerate distribution with a single value of time. We calibrate on the
distribution in the NT equilibrium, since the exact distribution varies
between equilibria (see Figure 4). We keep the same weighted average
value of time of DFl 9.08 per hour, again in the NT equilibrium; for the
uniform distribution, we accomplish this using an interval [1.20,16.96].
The height and price-slope of the demand surface are calibrated to keep
total road use and weighted demand elasticity in the NT equilibrium the
same as in the base case.
Figure 10 shows the impacts on relative efﬁciency. Of course, the
signiﬁcance of toll differentiation disappears with a single value of time;18
as a result, policies restricted to pricing just one parallel link perform
considerably worse than in the base case. Thus ignoring heterogeneity may
lead to serious underestimation of the efﬁciency of parallel link pricing, as
suggested also by Small and Yan (2001). Of particular interest, ignoring
heterogeneity would lead one to underestimate the relative efﬁciency of the
Figure 9
Varying the Weighted Demand Elasticity: Relative Efﬁciency
Note: For graphical clarity, relative efficiency for PSL, being close to that for PF, is surpressed. 
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18This is true also of PSL, not shown in the ﬁgure, and of PF, which, as noted earlier, produces very
little toll differentiation even when there is dispersion in values of time.
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SBPL policy by a factor of nine (0.025 compared to 0.229 in the base case).
This establishes that product differentiation by congestion level is indeed
critical to the evaluation of pricing policies that leave parallel roads
unpriced. At the other extreme, moving from the base-case to the uniform
distribution produces slightly more toll differentiation in the FB case, and
thus the second-best policies are slightly worse relatively. These latter
differences are small, however, so we conclude that the results of this paper
are not sensitive to the exact shape of the value-of-time distribution.
What if an erroneous assumption of a single value of time is carried
through to the toll-setting stage? The second-best toll for parallel-route
pricing (SBPL, single value of time) is only DFl 0.88, about 27 per cent of
the true second-best toll of DFl 3.31 (shown in Table 3). The actual use of
this smaller toll when true heterogeneity exists, as in our base case, would
lead to a relative welfare gain of o ¼ 0:103: This is 45 per cent of the
welfare gain from the correctly calculated toll, which is o ¼ 0:229 (again
as shown in Table 3). Therefore, a regulator knowing the average value of
time but ignoring its dispersion when setting the toll could lose about half
of the already limited efﬁciency gains possible from parallel route pricing.
For ﬁrst-best pricing, in contrast, the predicted optimal toll when
ignoring heterogeneity is DFl 9.19, not very different from the truly
optimal differentiated tolls of DFl 8.29 and 9.50. The relative welfare gain,
applying the former toll, is o ¼ 0:9199; that is, the inefﬁciency from
ignoring heterogeneity is only 8 per cent. Furthermore, the best one can do
Figure 10
Varying the Type of Distribution of Values of Time: Relative Efﬁciency
Note: For graphical clarity, relative efficiency for PSL, being close to that for PF, is surpressed. 
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with a single toll is o ¼ 0:9203 (the value for SBSL from Table 3).
Therefore so long as both parallel links are being priced, the inefﬁciency
from ignoring heterogeneity is almost entirely from adopting uniform
pricing, which may actually be optimal once collection costs are accounted
for; the further inefﬁciency from calculating the wrong uniform toll is
negligible.
This reconﬁrms an insight from earlier studies: second-best taxes are
not only by deﬁnition less efﬁcient than ﬁrst-best taxes, but in addition are
harder to implement optimally because they require more information.
First-best tax rules require knowing only the level of marginal external
costs in the ﬁnal equilibrium. The second-best tax rule for parallel-route
pricing, as derived for example by Verhoef et al. (1996), requires that the
regulator also knows the demand and cost elasticities. Our results show
that in addition it is important to know the distribution of values of time.
When such information is lacking or ignored, the resulting inefﬁciency
from non-optimal toll levels is much greater than for ﬁrst-best taxes.
5. Conclusion
This paper has reconsidered the road-pricing problem in a signiﬁcantly
broader context. We treat partial network pricing in a ﬂexible way by
considering two parallel routes followed by a shared link. We account for
heterogeneity of users by assuming a continuous distribution of values of
time. These innovations capture aspects of real applications of pricing, and
they turn out to have signiﬁcant effects.
Several new results stand out. First, when heterogeneity of road users is
considered, travel times in the ﬁrst-best optimum may actually be higher
on one of the routes than in the no-toll equilibrium. This is caused by the
use of differentiated tolls to provide a higher-quality service on link A by
crowding link B even more.
Second, the most common approach to analysing the beneﬁts of
parallel-route pricing creates two opposing biases. On the one hand, using
two parallel routes but ignoring the interaction of users on other parts of
the network (link C in our model) causes beneﬁts of second-best pricing to
be overstated, because users of the free lanes cause additional external
congestion costs elsewhere. On the other hand, ignoring user heterogeneity
causes beneﬁts of second-best policies to be understated, by a factor of
nine in our base case, because signiﬁcant efﬁciency gains due to separation
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of trafﬁc are omitted. Interestingly, it does not matter much to our results
exactly what form the heterogeneity takes.
A third result concerns the distribution of beneﬁts and losses. Under
ﬁrst-best pricing, users with the lowest values of time suffer the greatest
average welfare losses or enjoy the smallest average gains. Many
discussions of the politics of road pricing have focused on this point.
However, the pattern changes when close substitutes of the priced good
remain free: then, the users with intermediate values of time suffer most or
gain least. It is as though we were to offer airline travellers only propeller
planes or supersonic jets; this would cater to the extremes, but a lot of
people would want something in between. To the extent that democratic
processes cater to median preferences, this may help to explain why pricing
policies for congestible public facilities have made less political headway
than other market-oriented reforms.
Fourth, the degree of toll differentiation that maximizes either welfare
or revenue in an unconstrained setting is smaller than expected. The
importance of toll differentiation increases when demand becomes less
elastic, and when the parallel links have different free-ﬂow travel times.
Finally, the results conﬁrm a more general insight from studies in
second-best pricing: the amount of information required to apply a policy
instrument to best advantage increases with the ‘‘imperfectness’’ of this
instrument. For the case considered here, this information includes the
distribution of values of time and the demand elasticities of users having
different values of time. Thus, second-best policies require considerable
sophistication in order to achieve their theoretical beneﬁts.
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